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[T]he prison staff was unable to rescue the hostage. Because the 
threatened hostage was the same person as the threating perpetrator, they could 
not be separated. It was impossible to deny the perpetrator access to his hostage. 
The defendants were left with the almost impossible task of trying to protect a 
man from himself twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week . . . . Indeed, it 
is the prison staff’s very concern for [their inmate’s] physical safety that, in 
[their inmate’s] mind, gave him so much power over them.
Judge William C. Griesbach1
I. INTRODUCTION
The deliberate indifference doctrine requires prisons and prison staff to 
protect inmates from harm; the exact nature of the requirement is constantly 
challenged, but it is especially tricky when the harm involved is self-imposed by 
the inmate himself. Compare two prisoners. First, Matt Sanville.2 He has been 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, aggressive conduct disorder, bipolar 
disorder, dysthymic disorder, adjustment disorder, mixed personality disorder, 
and manic depression  by various doctors throughout his life.3 Sanville died by 
suicide in prison.4 Here s what led to his death: All of Sanville s doctors 
unanimously agreed that he needed medication.5 In 1997, after Sanville decided 
to stop taking medication, police arrested him for assaulting his mother.6
Although his mother and prosecutor agreed that Sanville was unthreatening when 
medicated and should therefore not be incarcerated, the judge sent him to prison.7
During his incarceration, Sanville persuaded the prison doctor to discontinue 
medication due to nausea and vomiting.8 Bizarre behavior followed, and Sanville 
sent a letter home contemplating his imminent death.9 The prison staff reacted 
by placing Sanville in solitary confinement; the State did nothing more, even 
1  Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F. Supp. 2d 977, 933 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 





7 Id. at 728 29.
Id. at 729. 
8 Id. at 729. 
9 Id. at 729
flushing clothes down the toilet, assaulting an inmate, and refusing food). 
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when Sanville stopped eating.10 It did not take long before he died by suicide in 
his cell.11
Now meet David Bowers.12 Bowers is currently incarcerated.13 Bowers s
doctors are less certain about his mental health than Sanville s doctors were
while his record contains diagnoses such as intermittent explosive disorder, some 
evaluators say he is not an individual who is mentally ill or intellectually 
incompetent. 14 In 2005, Bowers was transferred from one prison to another to 
complete a sentence for a drug crime.15 State healthcare providers have treated 
Bowers s potential mental illness throughout his incarceration, but, despite the 
treatment, Bowers has repeatedly engaged in self-harm.16 On multiple occasions, 
he has threatened to engage in self-harm unless guards acquiesce to his 
demands.17 Over time, state officials have concluded that the self-harm is 
manipulative and not psychotic. 18 Put differently, Bowers can control his self-
harm. 
Sanville and Bowers have much in common. Primarily, both prisoners 
have suffered self-inflicted injuries that the State failed to prevent, opening the 
door for prisoner civil rights claims.19 Central to this Article, however, is the 
glaring difference between the two inmates: the cause of their self-harm. On the 
one hand, Sanville committed suicide because of his mental illness. On the other 
hand, Bowers repeatedly engages in self-harm as a strategic and often successful 
way to negotiate with prison staff. It would seem that Bowers should fail if he 
brings a claim against the State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because otherwise he 
will be able to use the law to exploit the State. Yet, under the current law in some 
circuits, Bowers s and Sanville s claims would likely be treated the same. Using 
the Seventh Circuit as a case study, this Article argues that the two claims should 
be treated differently under the deliberate indifference framework. Furthermore, 
it argues that treating the claims the same makes the deliberate indifference 
10 Id.
11 Id. at 731. 
12  Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F. Supp. 2d 977, 978 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
13 Id.
14 Id. at 979 (citing a report prepared by a psychologist that analyzed Bowers in 1993). 
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 980, 989 (noting the various demands Bowers made to prison officials, such as that 
they give him certain property or medication, or that they transfer him to a different facility). 
Bowers even admitted his motivation. Id. 
extraction
made by Bowers)). 
18 Id.
19  John R. FitzGerald, Note, Non-Merit-Based Tests Have No Merit: Restoring District Court 
Discretion Under § 1915(E)(1), 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2169, 2169 (2018). 
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framework vulnerable to exploitation and therefore flawed. This Article argues 
that the flaw will be avoided if judges faithfully apply the current legal 
framework for deliberate indifference. 
To offer background, this Article begins in Part II by describing prisoner 
civil rights cases; Part II then goes on to explain what a prisoner who brings a 
claim based on self-inflicted harm must prove in order to prevail in a civil suit 
against the State. Next, using the Seventh Circuit as a case study, Part III analyzes 
the strongest argument for why a sane prisoner who engages in manipulative self-
harm ( MSH ) could prevail against the State: analogizing MSH with hunger 
striking. Part III then describes why it is problematic for claimants to prevail in 
sane MSH cases. Part IV shows that claimants like Bowers, who engage in MSH, 
are not in fact analogous to hunger strikers, which means the evolution of the 
doctrine in the Seventh Circuit is misguided. Part IV then demonstrates why 
claimants like Bowers should in fact lose on the merits when applying the 
deliberate indifference framework. Additionally, Part IV shows how Congress, 
or the Supreme Court, could clarify the law to ensure that MSH claimants cannot 
exploit the § 198320 loophole described in this Article. Generally, this Article 
offers a valuable guide for judges and states  attorneys confronted with a prisoner 
civil rights claim of deliberate indifference brought by a prisoner who is 
attempting to exploit § 1983 by engaging in MSH to manipulate prison staff. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prisoner Civil Rights Cases 
Prisoners in the United States can sue their jailors. 21 Prisoners, under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, can sue state actors who violate their constitutional rights 
while incarcerated.22 The list of state actors includes wardens, guards, nurses, 
doctors, and others.23 Prisoners can file civil rights claims, but they face obstacles 
that a traditional plaintiff does not confront in a civil lawsuit. 
For one thing, a prisoner must prove that the State violated the 
Constitution, a much greater challenge than proving a tort. A typical person who 
sees a doctor and suffers harm will recover if he can prove that the doctor acted 
negligently.24 In contrast, an inmate who sees the prison doctor will not recover 
under § 1983 if he can only prove negligence; rather, the prisoner must be able 
20  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2020). 
21 FitzGerald, supra note 19.
22  § 1983. 
23 Id.
24 What Is Medical Malpractice?, AM. BD. PRO. LIAB. ATT YS, https://www.abpla.org/what-
is-malpractice (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
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to show deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need 25 a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.26
Another unique obstacle faced by prisoners is the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.27 A full discussion of the doctrine, which has recently come under 
scrutiny in both academia and the courts,28 is not central to the argument of this 
Article.29 It suffices to say that qualified immunity protects government actors 
and halts a prisoner s § 1983 claim when the prison official does not violate 
clearly established law. 30 In other words, when there is uncertainty, the benefit 
of the doubt goes to the State rather than the prisoner. 
Additionally, prisoners face a series of obstacles enacted by Congress in 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ).31 The PLRA requires prisoners to 
pay filing fees, pay court costs, and exhaust all grievance procedures before filing 
a claim.32 Moreover, it requires judges to screen prisoner civil rights cases before 
allowing them to proceed,33 and allows judges to hold telephonic hearings.34 For 
the defendant, the PLRA relinquishes the obligation to respond35 and limits 
potential damages.36 These are only some of the obstacles set forth in the PLRA37
that are unique to prisoners. 
25  Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Corr. Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *1 (E.D. Wis. June 
24, 2014). 
26  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
27 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
28 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 500 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, 
J., concurring dubitante); Symposium, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: The Future of 
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2018). 
29  For a full discussion of the doctrine, see Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: The Future 
of Qualified Immunity, supra note 28. 
30  Samuel L. Bray, Foreword: The Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
violate clearly established law, has attracted many cr
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified 
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937 (2018) (discussing some of the problems caused by the 
31  42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 2020). 
32  28 U.S.C.A § 1915(a) (b) (West 2020); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174. 
33  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174. 
34  42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(f)(1); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174. 
35  42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(g)(1); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174. 
36  42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174 (footnotes omitted). 
37  For a more complete discussion of the PLRA, see Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003). 
5
FitzGerald: Sane, Manipulative Self-Harm: When Hostage and Hostage Taker Beco
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
588 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123 
Finally, because prisoner civil rights cases are civil lawsuits, the prisoner 
enjoys no constitutional right to an attorney.38 Yet few prisoners can afford 
representation.39 Some prisoners find a pro bono lawyer, either independently or 
by asking the court to appoint counsel discretionally based on indigency status.40
The remaining indigent prisoners are left to secure counsel in the same way as 
any other plaintiff, by entering a contingency fee agreement.41 Finding a lawyer 
willing to enter such an agreement is especially difficult for prisoners. Merit and 
substance aside,42 taking on a prisoner as a client may not be attractive to an 
attorney it requires traveling to the prison for every meeting and 
accommodating the time-consuming and sometimes invasive visitor protocol.43
What is more, some attorneys have moral apprehensions about representing 
prisoners or prejudices about the nature of the client, 44 which may lead them 
to decline to represent an inmate.45 These and similar conditions make securing 
counsel particularly challenging for a prisoner. 
The purpose of this Section is to show that prisoner civil rights claims 
are not easy to win. To put some numbers to it, between 1988 and 2011, prisoner 
civil rights cases were disposed of pretrial in favor of the defendant almost 85% 
of the time.46 In comparison, prisoner civil rights claims were decided pretrial in 
38  FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2169. 
39 Id.
40 Id. (reviewing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(E)(1), the statue that allows district courts to request 
private counsel to represent the plaintiff-prisoner in a prisoner civil rights case and considering 
what factors a judge should be able to consider when making that determination). 
41  Id. at 2185 86. 
42
stake in the litigation, as the remedy (and if damages, the amount of money) a plaintiff may be 
awarded. Id. at 2170. 
43 Id. at 2182
discovery, travel, and other litigation expenses. . . . [S]ince prisons tend to be isolated in rural 
locations, lawyers may have to travel far distances without reimbursement. Once they arrive at the 
prison, lawyers are at the mercy of the institution with regard to whether, and if so, how promptly, 
see also Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz, 
& Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL Y J. 149 
(2013); Raven Rakia, “A Living Nightmare”: Women Visiting Loved Ones Jailed at Rikers 
Describe a Pattern of Invasive Searches by Guards, INTERCEPT (Jan. 10, 2017, 4:08 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/10/rikers-island-strip-search-new-york-city-jails-visitors/. 
44  FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2183 (quoting Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil 
Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 417, 484 (1993). 
45  Professional Rule of Responsibility 1.16 addresses declining representation. MODEL RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS N 1980). Declining to represent an inmate for the reasons 
discussed above would not appear to run afoul of Rule 1.16 because it allows an attorney to 
Id.
46  Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 153, 165 fig.4 (2015). 
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favor of the plaintiff less than 1% of the time.47 Only 13% of prisoner civil rights 
cases went to trial, and of those, about 11% were decided in the plaintiff s
favor.48 It is important to keep this principle in mind that these are hard-to-win 
cases where the deck is stacked heavily against prisoners before discussing 
prisoner civil rights claims. 
B. Eighth Amendment Prisoner Civil Rights Claims 
One common prisoner civil rights claim is deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs. A prisoner who engages in self-harm and then files a 
lawsuit against prison staff for failing to prevent the harm will rely on a deliberate 
indifference theory. Such claims are predicated on the following principle, which 
the Supreme Court articulated in Estelle v. Gamble: An inmate must rely on 
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those 
needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce 
physical torture or a lingering death. 49 Because the inmate is entirely 
dependent on the prison to meet his medical needs, deliberate indifference to 
those needs constitutes an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 50 And 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of physical pain is, under the United States 
Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.51
A plaintiff must satisfy two prongs to successfully prove deliberate 
indifference: that the prison official was (1) deliberately indifferent to (2) a 
serious medical need.52 The first prong is subjective and the second is objective. 
47 Id.
48  Id.; see also Brian J. Ostrom, Roger A. Hanson & Fred L. Cheesman, Congress, Courts and 
Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1525, 1537 fig.2 (2003); Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA 
Approaches 20, 28 CORR. L. REP., Feb. Mar. 2017, at 69, 84 fig.3; Rachel Poser, Why It’s Nearly 
Impossible for Prisoners To Sue Prisons, NEW YORKER, (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible-for-prisoners-to-sue-
prisons. 
49  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 
(1890)). 
50  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). 
51  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
52  Haley Loutfy, Note, Health Care Behind Bars: Constructing a Uniform Deliberate 
Indifference Standard To Prevent the Use of the Eighth Amendment as Broad Prison Reform, 45 
LINCOLN L. REV. 77, 80 (2018). 
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A prisoner s claim thus fails if prison officials are unaware that the prisoner is 
injured or at risk of injury,53 or when the harm or potential harm is trivial.54
The first prong tests whether the prison official (or officials) possessed 
the requisite mens rea.55 The clearest and most recent Supreme Court guidance 
on this prong is Farmer v. Brennan.56 There, the Supreme Court rejected an 
objective test for the mens rea prong, under which a prisoner would satisfy the 
prong if he proved that the risk posed to him was known or should have been 
known by a reasonable prison official. 57 Instead, the Farmer Court opted for a 
subjective test, which is satisfied when prison officials are consciously aware 
of a serious medical need or substantial risk of harm and disregard that need or 
risk. 58
The latter prong tests the objective severity of the medical need. The 
Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on how to delineate what harm is 
serious enough to come within the purview of the Constitution. It is thus 
incumbent on district courts to assess severity and establish manageable 
standards.59
Even with the instruction of Farmer, the circuits have split on how to 
apply the subjective mens rea test. The circuit courts are also divided on how to 
assess what constitutes a serious medical need, which is not surprising given the 
absence of Supreme Court guidance on the matter. As a result, the two-pronged 
deliberate indifference test is applied differently in the various United States 
courts of appeals. 
53  For an example of an injury that prison officials would have a difficult time anticipating, 
and therefore be unable to establish the requisite subjective intent, consider an inmate whose 
appendix bursts without warning. E.g., FitzGerlad, supra note 19 (discussing Rivera v. Kettle 
Moraine Corr. Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, *1 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014), where an 
inmate sued his prison for failing to properly anticipate that his appendix would rupture, to which 
a constitutional violation). 
54  For an example of a trivial medical need, see Dickson v. Colman, 569 F.2d 1310, 1311 (5th 
Cir. 1978), where an inmate complained of shoulder pain from a three-year-old accident, but the 
examining doctor concluded that no treatment was necessary. 
55  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 81. 
56  511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
57  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 80. 
58 Id. at 81 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). 
59 Id.; Jason L. Stern, Prison (In)Justice: An Examination of the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jail-Suicide Claims, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 173, 186 (2013). 
8
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1. A Review of the Varying Deliberate Indifference Standards 
i. Deliberate Indifference: The Subjective Element 
Deliberate indifference analyses can be divided into two predominate 
camps. The first camp follows the grossly inadequate care  standard,60
whereby as the name suggests deliberate indifference is established by 
showing that care is grossly inadequate, or, more specifically, that the need for 
treatment is obvious, but medical care is so cursory as to amount to no treatment 
at all. 61 That a reasonable doctor could have considered his actions lawful is 
persuasive evidence that care is not grossly inadequate.62 Deliberate indifference 
may exist under this definition when, inter alia, (1) relief is available and an 
inmate needlessly suffers due to dilatory prison staff,63 (2) necessary medical 
treatment is delayed for nonmedical reasons,64 (3) prison officials opt for easier 
or less efficient courses of treatment,65 or (4) nonmedical prison officials know 
that an inmate is in extreme pain but delay access to medical personnel.66
The second camp ascribes to the medically unacceptable  test,67
whereby prison officials are deliberately indifferent when their care is so far 
afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not 
actually based on medical judgment . . . [and] that no minimally competent 
professional would have so responded under [the same] circumstances. 68
Deliberate indifference may exist under this standard when, inter alia, (1) harm 
to a prisoner becomes worse because of a delay in care,69 (2) prison staff fails to 
provide medication or treatment despite professional advice to do so,70 or (3) 
60  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 82 (attributing the standard to the First, Third, Sixth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits). 
61 Id. at 85. The Eleventh Circuit described its standard in Waldrop v. Evans
so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to 
62  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 85.
F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
63 Id. (citing Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
64 Id. (citing McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
65 Id. (citing McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1257). 
66 Id. (citing Rosseter v. Annetts, No. 9:10-CV-1097, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139265, at *47 
(N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)). 
67 Id. at 86 (attributing this test to the Seventh and Ninth circuits). The Third Circuit applies 
essentially the same test, finding deliberate 
Id. at 87 (citing Scott v. Corr. 
Med. Servs., No. 06-5552, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55553, at *14 (D.N.J. July 21, 2008)). 
68 Id. at 86 (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
69 Id. at 87 (citing Arnett, 658 F.3d at 753). 
70 Id.
9
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prison officials opt for an easier or less effective treatment without approval from 
a specialist.71
ii. Serious Medical Need: The Objective Element 
Like the subjective element, the objective element can be divided into 
two divergent camps.72 The first camp, consisting of the First, Third, Sixth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, defines a serious medical need as one (1) that has 
been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment; (2) that is so obvious that 
a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor s attention; or (3) for 
which the delay of or inadequacy of treatment would result in a substantial risk 
of serious harm. 73 This definition is the more rigid of the two camps. Prisoners 
have satisfied this test with heart-attack-like chest pain,74 severe and lasting 
mental anguish,75 and severe dental issues,76 to name a few. 
The Second and Ninth Circuits apply a broader test, under which a 
serious medical need is a condition  of urgency, one that may produce death, 
degeneration, or extreme pain. 77 Courts consider the following factors when 
applying this test: (1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or 
patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the 
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual s daily 
activities; or (3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain. 78 This test is broad 
and fairly easy to satisfy. 79
2. Tracing the Expansion of the Deliberate Indifference Doctrine: 
From Estelle to Self-Harm 
Estelle, the seminal deliberate indifference case, addressed indifference 
to an inmate s physical harm specifically, the pain suffered when prison staff 
allows an inmate s injury or physical illness to go untreated.80 Untreated physical 
71 Id. (citing Arnett, 658 F.3d at 754). 
72 Id. at 82. 
73 Id.
74  Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 754 (10th Cir. 2005). 
75  Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 180 (D. Mass. 2002). 
76  Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 44 (11th Cir. 2003). 
77  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 83 (citing Rosseter v. Annetts, No. 9:10-CV-1097, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 139265, at *28 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)). 
78 Id. at 83 (citing Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014); Chance v. 
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
79  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 84. 
80 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (involving an inmate who injured his back when 
complaints of back pain). 
10
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pain is the most obvious and basic basis for a deliberate indifference claim. Over 
time, the principles from Estelle have been applied beyond physical pain. 
Namely, courts have expanded deliberate indifference principles to apply to 
mental health.81 For instance, the State may be held accountable if an inmate dies 
by suicide and the prison failed to train its staff on how to care for suicidal 
inmates.82 The doctrine has also been applied to nonmedical cases; for instance, 
cases where prison staff fails to protect inmates from hurting one another.83 One 
core principle drives each incremental expansions of the doctrine: Because of his 
being incarcerated, the prisoner cannot protect himself from harm, and thus 
depends on the State to protect him. If the prison fails to protect him, he will go 
unprotected.84
Given the expansion of the doctrine and its driving principle, some 
inmates who engage in self-harm may have a deliberate indifference claim 
against the State. Here is the quintessential example: 
Prisoner A is a diagnosed schizophrenic. He is arrested, and the prison 
staff knows he is schizophrenic. Furthermore, the prison staff knows A is likely 
to engage in self-harm as a symptom of his schizophrenia if he is not properly 
treated. Instead of providing A with the proper medication and professional 
treatment, the prison staff keeps A in solitary confinement. While there, A harms 
himself.85
81 See, e.g., Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(applying the analysis from Estelle to a detainee suicide case); see also Taylor v. Wausau 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (noting this expansion of the 
doctrine form physical needs to mental health needs). 
82 See Partridge, 791 F.2d 1182. 
83 Taylor
context to require prison guards and jailers to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). 
84 Id.
85
to lawsuits. See, e.g., Jeff Coen & Stacy St. Clair, How Solitary Confinement Drove a Young 
Illinois Prison Inmate to the Brink of Insanity, HERALD & REV. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://herald-
review.com/news/state-and-regional/crime-and-courts/how-solitary-confinement-drove-a-young-
illinois-prison-inmate-to/article_09cca483-419a-57b5-aff1-b1b351d8e195.html (describing 
n, where he was kept in solitary confinement for 
twenty-two years causing his mental health to decline and causing him to frequently engage in self-
mutilation); Sam T. Levin, US Prisoner Gouged Out Eyes After Jail Denied Mental Health Care, 
Lawsuit Says, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/dec/08/prisoner-gouges-out-eyes-colorado-boulder-mental-health-lawsuit (describing 
him instead of treating his schizophrenia, leading him to self-mutilation). For a case demonstrating 
the straightforward successful claim, see Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1996). In that 
case, the prisoner was prescribed psychotropic medication at a prior prison. Id. He was then 
transferred to the defendant institution. Id. Upon transfer, the prisoner saw a doctor who met with 
him for less than a minute and decided to discontinue the medication. Id. The doctor made the 
decision without reviewing any of the p Id. After hearing the decision, the 
11
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A trickier case, or at least what this Article argues should be a trickier 
case, is one where the prisoner engages in self-harm for reasons other than mental 
illness or a loss of his faculties, which is what this Article means by the term 
sane.  Recall David Bowers, for instance. Bowers, so it seems, does not engage 
in self-harm or threaten to commit suicide because he suffers from an untreated 
mental illness. He does not seem to lack control of his faculties; rather, Bowers 
uses self-harm to manipulate prison staff and get what he wants, such as a transfer 
to a different institution.86
Finally, how we approach prisoner civil rights cases, it bears noting, has 
significant practical importance. It is difficult to find accurate statistics, but this 
much is clear: prisoner civil rights claims and deliberate indifference claims 
specifically comprise a large portion the federal docket.87 Innumerable 
prisoners are directly impacted on a personal level by how we define and 
understand deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth Amendment 
because, as plaintiffs bringing these claims, it dictates what they must prove and 
whether they can succeed. At the same time, because the law imposes such 
liability, how we define deliberate indifference directly affects prisons and states 
on an institutional level. Prisons must establish and inculcate procedures for 
preventing deliberate indifference, which imposes tremendous costs on the 
State.88 Also costly to the states are litigation fees fees spent defending guards 
and health-care staff in federal court when prisoners bring such a claim.89 In 
other words, how we define deliberate indifference dictates how prisons operate, 
and thus indirectly impacts the prison population as a whole.  
prisoner was at risk for suicide if he continued to go unmedicated. Id. Nevertheless, the prisoner 
went on without medication and the prisoner suffered insomnia, anxiety, and bodily pains. Id. at 
1267 68. Had the prisoner committed suicide, the case would make an even more straightforward 
and apropos example. 
86  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
87 See FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2169. 
88
When the prison has reason to believe an inmate may hurt himself, it typically requires a whole 
team of guards to suit up in protective gear, enter a cell, remove an inmate, and search him for 
items he could hurt himself with. Cf. ROBERT D. HANSER, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 78 (3d 
ed. 2020). In some instances, when an inmate is on suicide watch, prisons require constant 
observation by a guard. Cf. Williams v. Eckstein, No. 18-C-1426, 2019 WL 4261105 (E.D. Wis. 
Sept. 9, 2019). And in some instances, prisons must put inmates in restraint chairs to prevent self-
harm, which may cause the inmate to sue on the theory that the restraint chair constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. See, e.g., Brown v. Washington Dept. of Corr., No. C13-5367 RBL-JRC 2015 
WL 4039322 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2015).
89  The cost is especially high when the court recruits counsel for the inmate. See generally 
FitzGerald, supra note 19. 
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III. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MANIPULATIVE SELF-HARM IN THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
As a preliminary matter, it is important to distinguish two different 
harms that an inmate like Bowers may face and seek treatment for while 
incarcerated. First, the physical harm that occurs once self-harm is inflicted, such 
as the gash in his flesh once he cuts himself or the foreign object in his body once 
he inserts it. This kind of harm is not contemplated by this Article and is 
uncontroversial. Prison authorities undeniably have a constitutional obligation to 
treat these injuries, self-imposed or not.90 Second, the kind of harm contemplated 
here is the threat of harm that a prisoner who is predisposed to self-harm faces. 
Does the prison have an obligation to intervene and prevent such harm once it 
has notice that the prisoner plans to inflict it? That is the question considered 
here. In other words, the question is not whether the prison must stitch the self-
inflicted gash, but whether it must prevent the prisoner from self-inflicting the 
gash in the first place; or perhaps more to the point, whether the State is liable 
when prison staff fails to prevent the self-inflicted harm.91
The question remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. To narrow the 
focus here, this Article considers only how the Seventh Circuit has approached 
state liability in cases where the State has failed to prevent a sane prisoner from 
self-harm, using the Seventh Circuit as a case study. To that end, this Part begins 
by discussing Freeman v. Berge,92 where the Seventh Circuit ruled that prisons 
must intervene on non-mentally ill hunger strikers. Dicta in Freeman, which will 
be discussed below, suggested that prisons have a duty to intervene on sane, 
manipulative self-harm. This Part then traces how the Freeman Court s dicta 
later became law in Miranda v. City of Lake,93 where the Seventh Circuit 
seemingly held that prisons will be liable if they fail to prevent competent 
inmates form harming themselves. Last, this Part calls into question the legal 
underpinnings and the policy implications of Freeman and Miranda.
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. prison officials may 
force feed a hunger-striking inmate once a physician determines that the inmate s
life or health is at risk.94 In Freeman v. Berge, Judge Posner of the Seventh 
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 05 (1976) (holding that 
91  It also bears noting at the outset that the alternative to imposing liability on guards, medical 
staff, and the State, is not to allow guards to do nothing in the face of prisoners engaging in MSH. 
State prisons can impose a duty on staff to prevent such conduct. That way, those responsible and 
able to prevent the harm will be compelled to act, however the inmate or his estate will not have a 
claim for money damages. See Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889
90 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
92  441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). 
93  900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018). 
94  See Sara Cloon, Competent Hunger Strikers: Applying the Lessons from Northern Ireland 
to the Force-Feeding in Guantanamo, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL Y 383, 389 90 
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Circuit pointed out that force feeding arises in two distinguishable 
circumstances. In the first circumstance, a mentally ill prisoner is force fed when 
his mental illness causes him to refuse food.95 In this circumstance, the prison is 
constitutionally required to treat the inmate s mental illness by force feeding if 
necessary.96 After all, we assume (or at least hope) that an unincarcerated citizen 
suffering from the same mental illness would find similar treatment. Because of 
the inmate s incarceration, he cannot seek treatment himself, and the prison staff 
must step in and provide it. 
The second circumstance in which force feeding arises is when a 
prisoner chooses to refuse food in order to produce a certain outcome or simply 
make a political statement.97 And there are logical reasons he might do so; hunger 
striking is a traditional method prisoners use to protest the conditions of their 
incarceration.98 This is the circumstance the Seventh Circuit faced in Freeman 
when considering whether prisons are constitutionally required to intervene on a 
non-mentally ill hunger strike. In Freeman, petitioner Barrell Freeman s
maximum security prison required prisoners to eat alone in their cells.99 Inmates 
had to stand in the middle of their cells with pants on to receive each meal.100 A 
prisoner who failed to follow the rules would be refused food.101 Freeman did 
not want to wear pants, so on multiple days during a two-and-a-half year span he 
refused to wear pants and, per the institution s rule, was not served meals.102 As 
k. [The Code of 
-
(internal citations omitted)). 
95 See Freeman, 441 F.3d at 546. 
96 See id. (first citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 34 (7th Cir. 2001); and then 
citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)). The hypothetical inmate 
described here is analogous to Prisoner A described above. See supra note 85 and accompanying 
text. 
97 Freeman, 441 F.3d at 546. 
98 See Rusty Reeves, Anthony C. Tamburello, Jennifer Platt, Drew Tepper & Kerri Edelman, 
Characteristics of Inmates Who Initiate Hunger Strikes, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 302, 
 . . . event within a correctional instit
have very little leverage hunger strikes, work strikes, and self-mutilation being the primary 
options to produce a desired outcome. Sometimes these methods are successful. See Christie 
Thompson, Do Prison Strikes Work?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2016, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/21/do-prison-strikes-work; see also Bowers v. 
 . . . engaged in [self-harm] at [his previous 
institution] in order to get to [a new institution] (which he did) . . . 
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a result, Freemen lost significant weight103 and experienced blurred vision.104
Freeman sued the State, arguing that refusing to provide him food for failing to 
follow feeding protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment.105
Judge Posner wrote for the three-judge panel, stating in dicta that a
prison [cannot] allow a prisoner to starve himself to death, or even starve himself 
to the point at which he seriously impairs his health. 106 Although non-mentally 
ill people have a liberty interest in refusing life-saving treatment, Judge Posner 
reasoned, prisoners either don t have such an interest, or it is easily 
overridden. 107 The reasons, according to Judge Posner, are practical ones.108
Allowing prisoners to commit suicide would mean allowing them to cheat[] the 
gallows. 109 It would impede the prison s ability to maintain discipline because 
inmate suicide agitates the surviving prison population.110 Finally, allowing 
starvation could expose prisons to lawsuits and liability.111
The Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled against Freeman for three 
reasons.112 First, prison policy required that any prisoner who skipped all meals 
for three days in a row be inspected by health personnel.113 Second, Freeman s
food deprivation was self-inflicted.114 Third, Freeman did not experience any 
real suffering, extreme discomfort, or any lasting detrimental health 
consequences. 115
The sane  prisoner in Judge Posner s hypothetical, who refuses food to 
produce a desired outcome, is like Bowers. He is engaging in a type of self-harm 
not attributable to mental illness but instead attributable to manipulative intent
MSH. Freeman s dicta suggests that deliberate indifference principles have 
evolved into the rule that guards must now protect an inmate from the inmate s
103  Id. Freeman lost 45 pounds during his hunger strike. Id.
104 Id. at 547. 
105 Id.
106 Id. at 546. 
107 Id. (first citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe, 150 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam); then citing Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992); then citing Laurie v. 
Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 1995); then citing In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96 97 (N.H. 1984); 
then citing State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982); then citing McNabb v. 
95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); and then citing People ex rel.
of Corr. v. Fort, 815 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). 
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own efforts to injure himself, even in the absence of evidence of a severe mental 
illness that has robbed the inmate of his faculties. 116 Indeed, if a non mentally 
ill prisoner must be force fed in order to curtail the harm of a hunger strike, how 
can a court justify nonintervention to other forms of MSH (e.g., Bowers) where 
prisoners self-mutilate and threaten suicide as a manipulation tactic? The 
approach to hunger strikes described in Freeman buttresses an argument that 
prisons that fail to stop self-harm (regardless of its cause) must be held 
accountable for deliberate indifference. 
But Posner leaves a major issue in Freeman unaddressed. When prison 
officials are deliberately indifferent to a physical illness, mental illness, or threat 
from a fellow inmate, the rationale underlying such claims would seem to 
require a threat to the inmate s safety from which, as a result of his incarceration, 
he is unable to protect himself. 117 A claimant like Bowers, or a sane hunger 
striker, whose self-harm is not attributable to mental illness or some other 
condition that deprived [him] of his rational faculties, 118 marks a departure from 
the doctrine s underlying rationale. A prisoner engaging in self-harm for a 
calculated purpose makes a deliberate decision he is able to protect himself; he 
merely chooses not to. 
Twelve years after Freeman, in Miranda v. City of Lake,119 the Seventh 
Circuit made explicit what Posner had suggested in Freeman. Lake County Jail 
inmate Lyvita Gomes was placed on suicide watch and hunger strike protocol 
because she was refusing food, water, and all medical treatment.120 In the course 
of ten days, Gomes s weight dropped from 146 pounds to 128 pounds,121 which 
prompted a psychiatric examination by Dr. Hargurmukh Singh.122 Dr. Singh 
diagnosed Gomes with psychotic disorder not otherwise specified,  but 
prescribed no medication.123 Dr. Singh concluded that Gomes s mental health 
condition rendered her unable to understand the risks of not eating and unable 
to participate in her treatment plan. 124 Gomes s condition only worsened.125
Ultimately, Lake County Jail medical staff sent Gomes to a hospital 15 days after 
she arrived at the jail, and she died 5 days after that.126
116  Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2018). 
117  Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
118 Id.
119  900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). 
120 Id. at 342. 
121 Id. at 341. 
122 Id.
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Gomes s Estate filed several claims, naming several defendants, 
including Lake County Jail medical staff members.127 Only the claims against 
the medical staff members went to trial.128 At trial, Gomes s family members 
testified that Gomes was a devout Catholic with no history of mental illness and 
that she would not have committed suicide.129 Based in large part on that 
testimony, the district court decided to bar all reference to the theory that the 
medical defendants violated the Due Process Clause by failing to protect Gomes 
from harming herself. 130 Gomes s Estate challenged the decision on appeal, 
among other things. 
In its brief on appeal, the defendants urged the Seventh Circuit to affirm 
the district court s decision to reject the failure-to-protect theory, arguing in part 
that prison medical staff cannot be liable for failing to prevent a competent 
inmate from committing self-harm.131 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, 
holding that the district court would have to allow the plaintiff to pursue a failure-
to-protect theory at the retrial.132 The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows: While 
competent persons have a due-process right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition, the right does not extend to incarcerated persons.133 Citing Freeman,
the Seventh Circuit implicitly held that all inmates are incompetent, and that, 
jails therefore have a duty to prevent all prisoners from giving way to the unusual 
psychological strain caused by incarceration.134
The Miranda Court did not squarely address the departure from the 
underlying deliberate indifference policy i.e., that a sane prisoner engaging in 
self-harm is able to protect himself and merely chooses not to. But the Miranda 
Court addressed this departure by making the sweeping declaration that all 
inmates are incompetent. To use the parlance of this Article, the Miranda Court 
declared, in essence, that there is no such thing as a sane prisoner. 
But it cannot be true that there is no such thing as a sane prisoner. Yes, 
incarceration doubtless imposes mental strain on inmates, but that strain leads to 
behavior of many stripes violence against guards or other inmates, stealing, 
smuggling prohibited items and substances into prison, etc. and inmates are 
held responsible for such behavior. As they should be. After all, while many 
inmates have been diagnosed with a mental illness of one kind or another, 
prisoners are ultimately serving sentences for crimes because they have been 
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 349. 
130 Id. at 348 49. 
131 Brief of Defendants Appellees at 17, Miranda v. City of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(No. 17-1603), 2017 WL 4572369, at *17. 
132 Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (citing Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
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found criminally responsible for their behavior. Any prisoner who develops a 
severe mental illness after commencing a sentence should be transferred to such 
a mental health facility.
On a similar note, one could make the converse argument, that no
suicide is truly intentional[] because it is not an excercise of free will. 135 Put 
differently, instead of taking the approach of the Miranda Court and arguing that 
there is no sane prisoner, one could argue that there is no sane suicide. While that 
proposition may or may not be empirically true, just as it may or may not be 
empirically true that all prisoners are incompetent due to mental strain, U.S. law 
currently disavows this understanding of human behavior.136 The law assumes 
that, absent serious mental illness or other form of incapacity, a person has free 
will and is therefore responsible for his own intentional acts. 137 This 
understanding of human behavior is deeply rooted in U.S. law.138
A prisoner who is not suffering from a mental illness or any other 
condition robbing him of his faculties faces no threat of self-harm from which he 
cannot protect himself. Moreover, he faces no threat of self-harm from which he 
would protect himself but for his incarceration and from which he relies on prison 
officials, as a nature of his incarceration, to provide protection. In other words, 
MSH does not logically fit within the deliberate indifference doctrine. The core 
principle driving the doctrine does not apply. To sweepingly decide instead that 
all prisoners, or all suicides, must as a matter of law be the result of incompetence 
would be to depart from that core principle. 
Including MSH in the doctrine is not just illogical, it is also unwise. 
Policy considerations urge against allowing the manipulative self-harming 
prisoner to recover under § 1983. It would allow prisoners to engineer a 
constitutional claim, creating perverse incentives for prisoners to self-harm or 
threaten suicide.139 If the idea of the deliberate indifference doctrine or the 
135  Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 (Alaska 2001); see also LINDSAY M. HAYES, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PRISON SUICIDE: AN OVERVIEW AND GUIDE TO PREVENTION 6 (1995) 
-injurious 
C. Schlinsog, Jr., The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or Wrongfully Deceased, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 477 79 (1991). 
136  Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 51 (1952) (noting that the U.S. 
see also Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 
888 n.5 (explaining contradiction between the theory that no self-harm or suicide can be the product 
of free will and the position advanced by anyone who advocates for legal physician assisted 
suicide). 
139 Taylor -harming prisoner can 
recover under the Eight Amendment] would . . 
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Eighth Amendment generally is to keep prisoners safe and healthy, then MSH 
necessarily ought not be legally incentivized. 
Two perverse incentives are created by allowing inmates engaging in 
MSH to recover: negotiating power and money. If a prisoner can succeed on a 
claim of self-harm without showing that he was robbed of his faculties and could 
not prevent the harm himself, then prisoners are left with a macabre cost-benefit 
analysis: Is the self-imposed pain worth a possible increase in negotiating power? 
Better yet (for the prisoner) is threatening suicide which involves no physical 
pain worth a possible increase in negotiating power? If it is, and there are many 
reasons why it might be,140 then the prisoner will go forth with the threat of actual 
self-harm there is a chance prison staff will intervene and acquiesce to the 
prisoner s demand in order to avoid a constitutional claim. 
Another perverse incentive is the potential financial award. Money has 
great value in prison, as in all parts of society, and prisoners lack many ways to 
acquire it.141 A prisoner who wants money, whether to use in prison or send to 
someone outside of the prison, and who is not satisfied with the paltry wages 
available within the institution, may have no option but to lodge a prisoner-civil 
rights lawsuit. Unless that prisoner s constitutional rights are already being 
violated, he would have to find a way to engineer  a claim. As courts have 
recognized, it is bad policy to allow a prisoner the ability to engineer a 
Eight Amendment violation . . . 
2005)). 
140  Consider, for example, a prisoner with a high tolerance for pain who wants to be transferred 
to a different institution to be closer to his family and friends. A brief period of physical pain 
would if his negotiation is successful
a standard request. If he knows it might work and is willing to withstand the pain, why not give it 
a try? 
141  Telephone Interview with Robert Holleman, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility inmate, 
(Oct. 12, 2018) (describing his multiple successful § 1983 claims against Wabash Valley 
Correctional Facility, and explaining that the money, dollar-for-dollar, has more value in prison 
than out of prison, and explaining that he has no shortage of things he can use his money for, 
including sharing it with unincarcerated loved ones). To read about H
correction facilities, see, for example, Rebecca R. Bibbs, More than 30 Pendleton Inmates, 
Families Sue Corizon Health over Death, Injuries, IND. ECON. DIG. (Oct. 11, 2015), 
https://indianaeconomicdigest.com/main.asp?SectionID=31&SubSectionID=64&ArticleID=8148
2; Stuart Hirsch, DOC Inmate Wins Settlement; Federal Judge Rebukes Officials, HERALD BULL.
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.heraldbulletin.com/news/local_news/doc-inmate-wins-settlement-
federal-judge-rebukes-officials/article_20caa376-b2d7-11e7-a92a-c32da61758b2.html; Marilyn 
Odendahl, Same Court, New Experience, IND. LAW. (Aug. 28, 2012), 
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/29541-same-court-new-experience; Ruling for Doctor 
Reversed in Inmate’s Gluten-Free Diet Suit, IND. LAW. (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/43742-ruling-for-doctor-reversed-in-inmates-gluten-
free-diet-suit. According to Holleman, money has higher value because inmates can only work a 
limited number of jobs, paying two dollars per day at most. Aside from that, gifts and lawsuits are 
the only two ways to make money. Id.
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constitutional claim against his jailor.142 (If he can, then that fact marks a 
loophole in the law well worth fixing.) 
This Section has demonstrated two things. First, precedent suggests that 
a court confronted with the issue and the appropriate facts may rule in favor of 
an inmate in an MSH case. Second, such a holding would be problematic because 
it would mark an unjustifiable diversion from the core principle underlying the 
deliberate indifference doctrine: that the prisoner, by virtue of his incarceration, 
is deprived of his normal opportunities for protecting himself. 143 The holding 
would also create perverse incentives: it would give prisoners the ability to 
engineer Eighth Amendment claims by self-harming or threatening to self-harm, 
which would give manipulative, self-harming prisoners negotiating power. 
Prisoners could force prison officials to decide between acquiescing to inmate 
demands or facing § 1983 litigation. It could also cause prisoners to self-harm 
for a chance at a big financial award.144
IV. HOW TO FIX OR AVOID THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE LOOPHOLE
This Part proposes a solution on how to fix or avoid the deliberate 
indifference loophole in three Sections. Section IV.A distinguishes MSH from 
the sane hunger striker described in Freeman and Miranda to show that the 
precedential weight of the two cases should be limited to cases of hunger 
striking.145 Section IV.B considers how to properly analyze MSH under the two-
142 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 403 F.3d at 953; Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (citing Rodriguez, 403 
F.3d at 953). The Rodriguez court explained: 
Rodriguez punished himself . . . 
dinner every day unless he were served champagne and caviar at least once a 
month. He, not the prison, would be the author of his being denied dinner. A 
prisoner cannot force the prison to change its rules by going on a hunger strike 
and blaming the prison for his resulting loss of weight. He cannot, in short, be 
permitted to engineer an Eight Amendment Violation. The analogy is to civil 
contempt. A person who is imprisoned for refusing to sign a deed that he is 
legally obligated to sign, but who can get out of prison just by signing it, cannot 
complain that he is being punished. 
Rodriguez, 403 F.3d at 953 (internal citations omitted). For an example of a prisoner who, arguably, 
used self-harm to engineer a constitutional claim against his jailor, see Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F. 
Supp. 2d 977 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
143 Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
144  See, for example, Hirsch, supra note 141 for an indication of the damages at stake in prisoner 
civil rights cases. 
145  Of course, by its facts, Miranda is not a case of a sane hunger striker. Gomes was engaging 
in self-harm because of a diagnosed mental illness. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, 
Miranda is treated as a sane-hunger-
defendant argued that the evidence showed that Gomes was not mentally ill. The Court rejected 
the argument, not just by deciding that the record included significant evidence to the contrary, but 
even if Gomes were not mentally ill. See 
Miranda v. City of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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prong deliberate indifference analysis and concludes that such plaintiffs should 
typically fail under one or both prongs. Section IV.C explains how Congress, or 
the Supreme Court, could clarify the law in a way that eliminates the MSH issue 
altogether. 
A. Considering the Precedent: Distinguishing Starvation and Self-
Mutilation 
Under Miranda, the state is obligated to prevent harm even when the 
prisoner could protect himself from it a departure from the core deliberate 
indifference principle that a prisoner must not be able to defend himself against 
the harm posed in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. MSH is, 
however, sufficiently distinguishable from sane hunger striking that courts 
should not rely on Miranda to further extend the departure from this core 
principle. In other words, there is a difference between MSH and hunger striking, 
and, by sweepingly declaring that the state is liable in all cases of MSH regardless 
of mental health, the Seventh Circuit acted imprudently. 
The hunger striking in Freeman and Miranda, which is sane self-harm 
via starvation, is distinguishable from the sorts of self-harm contemplated here, 
most commonly self-mutilation or similar self-harm. Starvation is a unique kind 
of self-harm. It s gradual, noticeable, and easily interrupted.146 Once a prisoner 
stops eating, the state can easily notice it, monitor the inmate s health, and when 
it becomes apparent that the prisoner is in a serious risk of medical harm, the 
prison can rest assured that its intervention techniques will likely (although not 
always)147 be effective and constitutional.148 In contrast, self-mutilation or 
suicide (threatened or real) is typically acute and difficult to prevent without 
either accepting an inmate s demands, placing the inmate in a solitary cell,149 or 
restraining the inmate to make him immobile and unable to harm himself.150
Unlike starvation, the state cannot confidently know what will prevent MSH
146  It takes a person 21 to 70 days to die of starvation, and there are many developed ways to 
force feed prisoners who refuse food. See Catie Edmondson, Prison Inmates on Hunger Strike 
Being Force-Fed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/24/prison-inmates-on-hunger-strike-being-
forcefed/86372116/ (describing some methods of force feeding); Thomas C. Weiss, What Happens 
When We Starve? Phases of Starvation, DISABLED WORLD (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.disabled-
world.com/fitness/starving.php (regarding how long a person can survive without food). 
147 See, e.g., Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349. 
148 See Cloon, supra note 94. 
149  Sometimes this technique works and prevents self-harm. SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., 
WHAT CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONALS CAN DO TO PREVENT SUICIDE (2007). Sometimes, however, it 
exacerbates the problem. Id. It is impossible to know which will be the case, making this method 
less than ideal. Id.
150  This technique can lead to its own § 1983 claims, making this course of action also less than 
ideal. See Johnson v. McVea, No. 15-1586, 2016 WL 1223067 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2016). 
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in fact, the state cannot even know whether the inmate will engage in MSH until 
the inmate actually does. And to add to the complexity, any reaction by the state 
could induce further MSH.151 So, while the sane hunger striker is conceptually 
similar to the sane manipulative self-harmer, the state s menu of reactive options 
is quite different, and the state s calculus when deciding whether to intervene 
and how is exceptionally more complex. 
Not only is the harm notably different, the reasons for overriding the 
prisoner s right to starve himself do not equally apply to MSH. Whereas Posner 
is right that a prisoner allowed to starve himself to death is able to cheat the 
gallows at least insofar as opting for death over prison ends incarceration the 
same logic does not justify holding the state liable for failing to prevent MSH. 
Only death, not injury, ends one s punishment. It is true that the state s nonaction 
may, in some instances, lead to an inmate committing suicide if the state 
miscalculates about the necessary response to the threatened harm.152 Unlike a 
starving inmate, though, the prison officials need to make challenging decisions 
about whether an inmate is in fact likely to engage in MSH; how serious the 
potential MSH might be; how soon it will be inflicted, if at all; and whether 
responding to the threat of self-harm will benefit the prisoner s well-being, or 
induce more frequent and severe harm in the future. Allowing prison officials 
and medical professionals some latitude in making these calculations, rather than 
forcing them to err on the side of acquiescence to inmate demands (even if it is 
a course of action that will produce further and more widespread self-harm in the 
future), does not mean prisoners are permitted to cheat the gallows. Quite the 
opposite, a system that promotes self-harm as an effective negotiating strategy 
allows prisoners to game the penal system by giving inmates control over the 
conditions of their punishment. 
The second reason Posner gave for overriding prisoners  right to suicide, 
that permitting suicide impedes the prison s ability to maintain discipline, is 
turned on its head in the MSH context. Sure, allowing prisoners to starve 
themselves to death will agitate the inmate population and complicate the 
operation of the institution. But allowing prisoners to use MSH as a negotiation 
tactic impedes the prison s ability to maintain discipline in an even more direct 
and significant way. If prisoner A cuts himself one day and threatens to do it 
again the next unless he is transferred to a different institution, and to prevent 
further harm the state transfers A, it stands to reason that every prisoner who 
wants a transfer enough to withstand the pain is going to cut himself. And then 
what? Should they all be transferred? What if the demands are more outlandish: 
choosing cellmates, getting a cellphone, picking the lunch menu? As described 
151 See, e.g., Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 
17, 2018). 
152  Of course, the Stat
no action might be the appropriate reaction to self-harm or threatened self-
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above, the prison can take courses of action other than acquiescence,153 but none 
are ideal, and nonaction may justifiably be the safest and most optimal route. 
Eliminating nonaction from the state s menu of reactive options is what will most 
impede the prison s ability to maintain discipline. 
The third and final reason Posner gave is that allowing inmate suicide 
would expose prisons to lawsuits brought by decedent prisoners  estates.154
Posner is right, but the reasoning is uncompelling because it is irrelevant, a red 
herring. Whether or not recognizing a right will produce litigation does not 
address the real issue: the existence of the right in the first place. Overriding a 
right because its existence would expose violators of that right to lawsuits 
follows the same logic as decriminalizing murder because it exposes murderers 
to criminal punishment of course it would, all crimes expose offenders to 
criminal punishment, that is the point. All rights expose others to potential 
lawsuits because a legal right is a prerequisite for a case.155 What is more: If a 
right can be justifiably overridden because it will produce lawsuits, what does 
that mean for rights writ large? 
The two propositions that sane hunger strike and MSH are distinct 
types of self-harm, and that the reasons to override a prisoner s right to engage 
in the former do not apply to the latter taken together, show that the dicta in 
Freeman should have little if any bearing on the issue of MSH. Therefore, even 
if sane hunger strikes constitute a permissible departure from the core deliberate 
indifference principle (that the prisoner faces a harm from which he cannot 
protect himself), MSH does not. 
B. Applying the Deliberate Indifference Test to MSH 
It may seem intuitively wrong that an inmate engaging in MSH could 
recover under § 1983. It should because, as mentioned above, it marks a 
departure from the underlying principle of deliberate indifference. Such a 
claimant is not facing a threat to his safety from which, because of his 
incarceration, he cannot protect himself.156 But that principle even though it 
drives the doctrine is not itself a part of the test for deliberate indifference.157
The only two factors are (1) that the prison was deliberately indifferent to (2) a 
serious medical need.158
Even though it is not part of the doctrine, the driving principle matters. 
The underlying principle drives what the test seeks to determine. If a plaintiff 
153  Most notably, the prison can put the inmate in solitary confinement or restrain the inmate
but both courses of action are not ideal. 
154  Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546 47 (7th Cir. 2006). 
155  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
156  Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
157  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 80. 
158 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
23
FitzGerald: Sane, Manipulative Self-Harm: When Hostage and Hostage Taker Beco
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
606 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123 
satisfies both prongs of the deliberate indifference test, but he is not facing a 
threat to his safety from which he cannot, due to his incarceration, protect 
himself, then the test is either insufficient or it is being incorrectly applied. This 
Article argues that allowing MSH petitioners to prevail constitutes the latter, an 
incorrect application of the test.159
1. Applying the Deliberate Indifference (Subjective) Element 
Both definitions of deliberate indifference described above the
grossly-inadequate-care definition and the medically-unacceptable-care 
definition support the conclusion that at least some instances of MSH do not 
satisfy the subjective element. The two definitions are discussed in turn. 
Prison staff members are not deliberately indifferent under the grossly-
inadequate-care standard when the need for care is nonobvious or when the care 
provided is not grossly inadequate.160 In a case of MSH, whenever the likelihood 
of self-infliction is uncertain, for instance, if prison staff confront a prisoner who 
frequently threatens but never inflicts self-harm, the need for care is nonobvious. 
In such circumstances it is unknown whether the prisoner needs care. What is 
more, whenever a medical professional concludes that no intervention is the best 
reaction to a prisoner s MSH, and advises prison staff accordingly, it reasonably 
follows that nonaction is not grossly inadequate.161 If nonaction is what the 
medical professional advises as the best course of action, it is not only adequate, 
it is optimal. In comparison, intervention, especially acquiescence to the 
prisoner s demands, may be grossly inadequate because it may ultimately 
encourage self-harm if he or his fellow inmates come to see MSH as an effective 
negotiation tactic. 
In other jurisdictions, prison staff is deliberately indifferent under the 
medically-unacceptable-care standard when care raise[s] the inference that it 
was not actually based on medical judgment  such that no minimally competent 
professional would have so responded under [the same] circumstances. 162 Under 
this definition, a prison must be able to show that a health professional evaluated 
the inmate and concluded that no intervention was appropriate, and furthermore, 
that the conclusion was medically reasonable. Similar to the grossly-inadequate-
care standard, the MSH prisoner should not be able to satisfy the deliberate 
indifference prong as long as the course of action taken is defensible as a matter 
159
an evidentiary hearing. Both plaintiff and defense would likely call expert witnesses doctors 
specializing in psychiatry, psychology, or the like to testify to com
sanity, and ultimately the factfinder would make the decision. 
160  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 85. 
161  This proposition 
grossly inadequate. 
162  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 86. 
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of medical judgment.163 Under both tests, it is crucial that the prison staff seek 
professional medical advice when deciding how to react to the threat of harm. 
When it is not borne out of professional medical judgment, opting for nonaction 
will be tough, if not impossible, to defend. But when nonaction is the product of 
medical judgment, it should rarely, if ever, give rise to a successful prisoner civil 
rights claim. 
2. Applying the Serious Injury (Objective) Element 
The objective element is easier for a prisoner to satisfy than the 
subjective element, but some instances of MSH will not satisfy this element. 
Under the more rigid definition of serious injury, the mandated treatment and 
obviousness definition,164 serious harm is (1) a diagnosis requiring treatment, (2) 
so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for medical attention, or 
(3) a harm so serious that delayed or inadequate treatment would put the prisoner 
in a substantial risk of harm.165 The three parts of the definition are discussed in 
turn. 
As for the first part, a diagnosis requiring treatment, MSH will not 
always satisfy the standard because in some cases the risk of self-harm will not 
be diagnosed by a physician as a condition  requiring treatment. After all, when 
there is no indication that the risk of injury is symptomatic of an untreated mental 
illness, what would the condition  be? And what would the treatment be? In 
such instances, the physician would likely find no condition  to diagnose, and, 
even if she did consider the propensity for self-harm a condition,  she may 
determine that nonaction is the best reaction to avoid incentivizing future self-
harm, as opposed to any formal treatment.
As for the second part of the definition, that the injury is so obvious a 
lay person would recognize the need for medical attention, the proverbial lay
person  in this situation may not consider it obvious that the condition  requires 
a doctor s attention. If the lay person shares the same understanding of human 
behavior as our legal system that, absent serious mental illness or other form 
of incapacity, a person has free will and is therefore responsible for his own 
163 See Davis v. Harding, No. 12-CV-559-wmc, 2014 WL 5454216, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 24, 
-harm to manipulate staff and that he had 
not acted on a threat of self-harm in over three years. Under these circumstances, [the doctor] 
 . . . . 
Davis has offered no 
was an act of deliberate indifference, rather than one of many ordinary acts of discretion doctors 
164  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 82. 
165  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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intentional acts 166 then he may reason that a doctor s attention is unnecessary 
to prevent an act of free will. 
Finally, regarding the third part of the definition, the delay or inadequacy 
of treatment does not result in a substantial risk of serious harm when treatment 
is deemed an ineffective course of action. If nonaction is the best reaction, there 
is no treatment to delay.167
Even under the broader definition, some instances of MSH may not 
satisfy the serious-injury element. The broad definition relax[es] the serious 
injury element making it fairly easy to satisfy the first prong of the deliberate 
indifference test. 168 The argument against liability is weaker under this 
definition, but it is still worth making. It will be the rare case that the potential 
for self-inflicted harm is not worthy of comment.  In the event that a prisoner 
regularly threatens self-harm, however, and never follows through, allowing the 
prison system to confidently call the inmate s bluff,  the threat of harm may 
indeed not be worthy of comment. Indeed, such confidence by the prison staff 
may be rare. That being said, because this broad definition of the objective 
element dilutes the objective element to the point that it almost serves no 
purpose, a court would be justified in setting a higher bar for the subjective 
element when applying the not-worthy-of-comment test for the objective 
element. 
* * * 
Looming in the background of this discussion is the fact that a prisoner 
has almost no ability to control his situation and every incentive to sue his jailor. 
Doubtless, Congress could dwarf the prevalence of MSH in prisons by 
engendering better avenues for inmates to bargain with their jailors and effect 
change. For this reason and innumerable other reasons beyond the purview of 
this Article169 Congress should re-implement a sentencing scheme whereunder 
prisoners may be eligible for early release on parole for good behavior. 
This is not an Article about sentencing, so a deep dive into American 
criminal sentencing is inapt, but a few words are in order. The federal criminal 
system once abided by a flexible sentencing scheme: Indeterminate sentences 
were imposed, which meant that the judge  exercised discretion at the outset 
when imposing the sentence in deciding when during the course of an 
offender s sentence he would become eligible for parole.170 Once an inmate 
166  Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
167
nonaction is the best reaction presumably with expert testimony a question of fact would arise 
for the jury to determine. 
168  Loutfy, supra note 52, at 84. 
169 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons: 
Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 1 (2013). 
170  Gerald Bard Tjoflat, The Evolution of the Federal Criminal Sentencing System, 13 AM. U.
INT L L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1998). 
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became eligible for parole, the Parole Commission exercised discretion to 
determine whether to grant parole.171 The system had its basis in a rehabilitation 
theory of punishment.172 The idea being that the Parole Commission would 
decide whether an inmate was sufficiently rehabilitated to successfully return to 
society.173 Starting in the mid-1970s, the criminal justice system gradually 
moved away from the flexible sentencing model and toward a determinate 
sentencing model.174 Under a determinate sentencing model, an offender s
sentence generally cannot be shortened based on an inmate s behavior.175 The 
determinate sentencing model is essentially what federal prisoners encounter 
today.176
A lot has changed since the 1970 s. For instance, we have more 
information: we now know determinate sentencing causes a deluge in prisoner 
litigation.177 We also have better technology: for instance, we now have reliable 
and affordable GPS tracking devices and drug testing technology.178 It is time to 
return to a more flexible sentencing model. Such a model would remove or at 
least relax many of the perverse incentives alive in the current system that 
influence prisoners to bring frequent lawsuits and induce poor behavior, just one 
example of which is MSH. 
V. CONCLUSION
This Article identifies a loophole in the current deliberate indifference 
doctrine that prisoners can and are exploiting.179 Specifically, prisoners can 
engineer a § 1983 claim with MSH. The loophole is problematic because it 
incentivizes self-harm and, if allowed to persist, gives dangerous negotiating 
power to prisoners. Not only is this loophole problematic from a public policy 
171 Id.
172  Jonathan J. Wroblewdki, History and Future of the Sentencing Commission, 13 AM. U. INT L
L. REV. 1072, 1073 (1998). 
173  Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 1079. 
174 See id. at 1079 80. 
175  Under the current federal sentencing scheme, an inmate can only earn a maximum of 54 
days off of his sentence per year for good behavior. In other words, regardless of behavior, an 
inmate must serve 85% of his sentence. Glossary of Federal Sentencing-Related Terms, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM N, https://www.ussc.gov/education/glossary (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
176 Id.; Michael Santos, How To Understand Sentencing Systems, PRISON PROFESSORS (Aug. 
26, 2017), https://prisonprofessors.com/how-to-understand-sentencing-systems. In contrast to the 
federal criminal system, several states follow the indeterminate sentencing model. BUREAU OF 
JUST. ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING.
177 See Schlanger, supra note 37, at 1584 Fig. I.A. 
178 See, e.g., Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (2017) (discussing 
GPS tracking); David Evans, 1 Drug Testing Law Tech. & Prac. §5:1 (2020 West) (discussing drug 
testing). 
179 E.g., Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2018). 
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standpoint, it also represents an untenable departure from the deliberate 
indifference doctrine. The principle underlying the doctrine that the prisoner, 
by virtue of his incarceration, is deprived of his normal opportunities for 
protecting himself 180 does not apply to MSH. 
In reaction to the problematic and doctrinally precarious loophole, this 
Article makes multiple suggestions that, if followed, will alleviate the possible 
consequences. On the conservative end, this Article shows how courts should 
treat MSH cases under the current deliberate indifference frameworks. MSH 
claims should at least fail one of the two deliberate indifference prongs and may 
fail both. Attorneys representing the state, as well as courts hearing these cases, 
should draw from the reasoning here to avoid exacerbating a jurisprudential 
loophole and overstretching the deliberate indifference doctrine. 
On the more quixotic end, this Article shows that Congress or the 
Supreme Court could clarify the deliberate indifference framework. Specifically, 
the framework would require that the prisoner to prove: (1) deliberate 
indifference (2) to a serious medical need (3) that was not self-inflicted by a 
prisoner who acted on his own free will. 
Prisoner self-harm presents a unique and challenging problem. It is 
uncomfortable to talk about and easy to ignore. But it is a serious and sad reality 
that ought to be handled with care.181 The reason for closing the current loophole 
is not to eliminate one of the few aspects of an inmate s life that he controls and 
to make inmates even more vulnerable to the state s will. On the contrary, the 
goal is to reveal how the loophole puts prisoners in danger and to offer some 
ways to prevent it. If the law protects the sane manipulative self-harmer and gives 
him damages in court, then there will inevitably be situations where the 
reasonable prisoner will correctly calculate that self-harm is his best option, 
which should never be true. 
180  Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
181 E.g., Seena Fazel, Taanvi Ramesh, & Keith Hawton, Suicide in Prisons: An International 
Study of Prevalence and Contributory Factors, 4 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 946 (2017). 
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